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  The theory of the multinational corporation (henceforth MNC) has undergone a 
great development since Hymer's seminal contribution1. Emphasis was mostly given to 
the identification of the determinants of multinationalization. The range of possible 
explanations - based on theories of the firm or of market structure - became so vast that 
it somehow forced Dunning (1981) to suggest a framework that could encompass them 
all. 
  Independently of single theories, however, a common feature was that the firm 
was assigned a crucial role. It was, so to say, the cornerstone of a more general theory 
of multinationalization. 
  Truly, other traditions exist - including general equilibrium theorists (Helpman, 
1985) and neo-marxists (Jenkins, 1987) - which have attempted to assess the nature of 
multinationalization, but these traditions either neglect the firm as such or, when they 
acknowledge its existence, they refer to the above theories. 
  A yet unsolved issue is what relation there is between the behaviour of firms 
and the productive structure of an economy. Traditionally, in a Walrasian setting, given 
specific assumptions, the overall outcome of the activities of single agents was 
provided by the sum of individual outcomes. Once the above assumptions do not hold, 
the relation remains to be identified. 
  This is surely an issue that requires further investigation, and a solution to it is 
certainly beyond the scope of this paper. Regularities can be observed, however, in 
national economies. In this respect, Ozawa's analysis of Japanese multinationalization 
may be of some interest. The relation he traces between (Japanese) industrial 
development and multinationalization suggests an explanation for the latter which is 
somewhat different from that of prevailing theories, in that the conduct of single firms 
is not the main determinant but a consequence of other processes which occur at the 
level of the economy as a whole. Needless to say, this "switched" relation provides 
some interesting insights on the effects of multinationalization. 
  The above approach raises various issues which the paper aims to discuss. First, 
is there any logical problem that prevents the prevailing theory of the MNC from 
drawing conclusions on the functioning of the economy as a whole? An answer to this 
question allows us to understand whether we are merely confronted with different 
emphases among scholars or Ozawa's approach is actually at odds with (prevailing) 
theories of the multinational corporation.  The point of departure for the present 
analysis is precisely Ozawa's work. The next section of this paper will outline a few 
elements of his work which are believed to be of great interest for the discussion that 
will follow. Section 3, in turn, will attempt to point to a major shortcoming in 
prevailing theories of the MNC: they provide interesting insights on the behaviour of 
single firms but cannot explain more general (nationwide) phenomena. The yet 
unsolved theoretical issue is that of the relation between the firm and the rest of the 
economy: the identification of the consequences of firm behaviour on the economy as a 
whole is claimed to remain an open issue because no theory has provided a satisfactory 
                                                            
1. A recent survey is in Graham (1994). See also Ietto-Gillies (1992). 
2 account of what is to substitute the Walrasian market once general equilibrium 
conditions are assumed away. This, in turn, suggests that there still are open issues in 
the theory of the firm. 
  Once Ozawa's original approach is acknowledged, can a unifying framework be 
identified that allows to understand common features and differences in national 
patterns of multinationalization? What common explanatory elements do different 
patterns have? Given Ozawa's approach, the question may be thus restated: since 
multinationalization depends on the nature of industrial development, what are the 
general traits of the latter which may help to understand the former? A related question 
is what role is played by the theory of the firm and how can its above mentioned open 
issues be coped with? Section 4 focuses on these issues. It outlines what are believed to 
be a firm's major objectives and the possible strategies it can resort to. The implications 
for patterns of industrialization and patterns of innovation are then outlined.  
  Finally, the implications that the above approach has on a general theory of 
multinationalization have to be identified. Section 5 focuses on this issue by examining 
a stylized correspondence between two extreme strategic models and Japanese and 
American historical experience. Section 6, with some brief concluding remarks, ends 
the paper.  
 
 
2. JAPANESE EXPERIENCE AND THE THEORY OF THE MNC 
 
 
  In 1978 Kojima (Kojima, 1978) contrasted American and Japanese foreign 
investment. He argued that the former consisted in a duplication of domestic industries 
abroad while the latter consisted in locating abroad industries that it was not convenient 
to keep in Japan anymore. The distinction was interesting, even though it appeared to 
be more an attempt to defend Japan's multinationals than an explanation of different 
processes2. 
  Ozawa (1979; see also 1991) retains the specificity of Japan's pattern of 
multinationalization but links it to the country's industrial development. Four phases 
are identified, each characterized by the leading role of a technologically homogeneous 
group of industries. Related to these phases are three stages in Japanese 
multinationalization3. 
  Ozawa explains switches from one phase to the other in terms of the constraints 
to Japanese domestic development that arise within each phase. The constraints appear 
as negative externalities and affect overall development more than that of each single 
firm's. As a result, multinationalization has to be enhanced by government intervention 
because Japanese firms would not be prepared to go abroad otherwise, at least not to 
the required extent.   
                                                            
2. "An unfortunate pro-Japanese anti-American slant", as Cantwell (1991:38) put it. 
3. Japan's pattern of multinationalization today may be somewhat different from the past, as Ozawa 
(1991:143) acknowledges: "For Japan, the present overseas investment boom is not merely an 
adjustment to the internal growth pattern but an effective instrument of the current phase of industrial 
restructuring at home.". I will deal with more recent issues further on. 
3   In Japan's pattern of industrial development a leading industry (or group of 
industries) is made the most of until a moment comes when its potentialities are 
deemed inadequate. From then on, it is, so to say, discarded and relocated abroad.  
  The potentialities referred to are the capability to prevent - or provide a solution 
to - the externalities related to Japan's development4. As an industry develops, a 
solution to the problems it raises will be found only by identifying, where possible, te-
chnological, organizational or social changes. When all these possible changes have 
been resorted to and no solution is at hand, it is time to change the leading industry. 
Under these circumstances, relocation abroad relates neither to single stages in a 
production chain nor to single firms: it is an industry specific phenomenon. 
  The above approach raises two distinct issues. First, Ozawa points to 
determinants of multinationalization that have little or no relation to the behaviour of 
single firms. The question is whether the firm may still be conceived of as a (or the) 
cornerstone in the analysis of multinationalization. More precisely, the issue concerns 
the possibility that the firm be studied independently of the environment it is in. 
  As for the second issue, the difference between Japan's multinationalization and 
that of other countries is only weakly associated to given characteristics - such as 
resource endowments - of a country. Multinationalization is a process dependent on 
another process, that of domestic industrial development. To some extent this suggests 
that a theory of multinationalization should somehow relate to what makes 
industrialization different in single countries. In turn, this implies that what has to be 




3. EFFICIENCY, POWER, AND THE MARKET 
 
 
  In a Walrasian market, general equilibrium is achieved as a result of single 
agents acting independently of one another. For it to occur a set of conditions must be 
fulfilled. Information is (perfectly) transmitted all over the economic system by prices. 
Technology precludes economies of scale. The number of existing agents and the 
amount of transactions that take place prevents markets from being thin. No agent may 
attain more bargaining power than any other. Finally, a Walrasian market has no firms. 
  Theories of the MNC have (explicitly or implicitly) explained the existence of 
firms by resorting to two different sets of assumptions. The first approach followed is 
that of industrial economists. They assume away one or more of the conditions under-
lying perfect competition, and explain the MNC in terms of market imperfections.  
  Despite its appeal, this approach does not provide a framework for an 
assessment of the effects of the behaviour of firms. Given the existence of 
imperfections, it is rather difficult to understand what the effects of individual 
behaviour on the economy are. Indeed, it is straightforward that the conditions external 
to each agent which should lead to an efficient allocation of resources - in other terms, 
the Walrasian market - do not exist, so that cost minimizing behaviour on the part of 
individuals need not lead to general equilibrium or to Paretian efficiency.  
                                                            
4. These are broadly intended  to include, among others, shortage of factory workers and of land, as well 
as pollution. 
4   Neoclassical welfare economics has acknowledged the existence of market 
imperfections and the consequent need for measures to overcome them. But in the case 
of MNCs, imperfections are the very reasons for their existence. Thus, either they are 
removed, in which case multinationalization will disappear, or they are not, and a 
Walrasian market will not exist.  
  The relevance of the issue is not merely due to welfare considerations. Note that 
in the Walrasian framework the term "market" depicts two distinct, albeit related, 
concepts. First, it is the environment where agents act (an idealized town square). Se-
cond, it is a "coordination instance" (Dopfer, 1994) which determines the outcome of 
the behaviour of the above agents (the auctioneer or, more appropriately, the price 
mechanism). Once a perfectly competitive market is ruled out, the question is what 
substitutes the Walrasian price mechanism. 
  The second approach is the neo-institutionalist. It introduces a rather more 
elaborated notion of the market, whereby transactions would be determined not only by 
prices but also by transaction costs. A firm is, in this view, the efficient (cost-
minimizing) reaction of agents to these specific features of the economy. 
  Transaction costs could be viewed as the result of imperfections (Buckley, 
Casson, 1976). If this were true, there would be little difference between the present 
approach and the one outlined above. The market would remain the same 
conceptualized by Walras. Its only distinguishing feature would consist in the im-
perfections identified. Coase's view appears to be different, however. He explicitly 
states that, by referring to a Walrasian benchmark, "analysis proceeds in terms of a 
comparison between a state of laissez faire and some kind of ideal world. This ap-
proach inevitably leads to a looseness of thought since the nature of the alternatives 
being compared is never clear." (Coase, 1960/1988:154). 
  Coase's remark points to a crucial methodological issue. Nonetheless, when a 
Walrasian benchmark is abandoned, allocative efficiency5 becomes a rather vague 
concept, whereby  his own conclusions concerning the nature of the firm become - at 
the very least - shaky. When internalization is a response to transaction costs, a firm 
arises as an allocating mechanism alternative to the (market based) price mechanism. 
Under such circumstances, the Walrasian auctioneer will have little work to do. As a 
result neither (overall) equilibrium nor (overall) efficiency will be achievable. 
Furthermore, internalization may be a way to minimize transaction costs but it may be 
a means to set up entry/exit barriers, thereby attaining market power. Thus, either 
efficiency is defined as mere cost minimization - in which case agents do not maximize 
profits through strategic behaviour - or it encompasses both types of behaviour, and a 
different notion of efficiency is called for. But if a different notion is resorted to, the 
biunivocal correspondence between individual behaviour and overall (market) outcome 
remains to be proved. 
 
  Following an assessment of Hymer's contribution to the theory of the MNC, 
two strands of thought were identified, based on the emphasis given to efficiency as 
opposed to power6. This distinction appears to be the result of the unsolved issues 
concerning the effects of multinationalization: the above discussion of the viability of 
                                                            
5. It should be clear from the above discussion that the only notion of efficiency that is relevant here is 
allocative efficiency. 
6. See Dunning, Rugman (1985) and Acocella (1988). 
5 the notion of efficiency should be sufficient to cast doubt on the possibility of 
Walrasian outcomes to multinationalization. What may be of some interest is the 
theoretical framework that ensues once some form of power is assumed to exist. 
  A rather restrictive notion of power is monopoly power. If a firm has a 
competitive advantage over other firms, it is argued, it may try to use it to force them 
out of the market. Thus, although a firm's conduct may actually be rational and profit 
maximizing, the outcome may be inefficient for the economy as a whole. Strategic 
behaviour, as analysed in most game-theoretic models, is based on this notion of 
power. Game theory provides interesting insights on how single agents will use their 
market power to achieve their goals. However, it is basically used for partial 
equilibrium analysis and it cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of how the 
coordination instance will be affected7. 
  A broader notion of power is in the concept of control, as suggested by Cowling 
and Sugden (1987). Strategically minded firms are assumed to pursue dominance of 
production and distribution so as to maximize8 profits. Following Marglin (1974, 
1984), emphasis is on the fact that, when the behaviour of firms is considered, 
"Efficiency is not the concern" (Sugden 1991:181).  
  It is not clear how the above statement must be interpreted. Allocative 
efficiency never is a concern in a Walrasian context, since it is merely the outcome of 
profit maximizing behaviour within a particularly constrained environment. 
Conversely, when  assumptions on behaviour are different from those of a Walrasian 
context, as in the case of Cowling and Sugden, the economic environment and its con-
straints cannot but differ as well. And differences relate not only to what is given but 
also to the possibility that changes occur. 
  This issue may be better understood by considering that, in a strategic context, 
agents must specifically take account of the relative power they have. They do not only 
use given resources in the best way possible, they try to change their budget con-
straints. Contrary to general equilibrium theory, Cowling and Sugden assume that 
"initial conditions" may be changed by single agents. As a result, a Paretian 
comparison between two different situations - to judge whether one is unanimously 
preferred by all - will seldom be possible, because the initial distribution of resources - 
which is assumed to be given in a Paretian context - will not be so in Cowling and 
Sugden's environment.   A different efficiency criterion is suggested by Marglin 
(1974). In his study of the rise of the factory system, he resorts to "technological 
efficiency"9, whereby labour is measured in terms of working hours rather than in 
terms of its (monetary) cost. This suggests that resources (labour) could be better 
allocated if prices were not taken account of, i.e. if priorities other than those of 
capitalism (bosses and their price related decisions) were considered; it does not 
provide a criterion to assess what determines the conduct of firms, and MNCs, within 
capitalism. 
                                                            
7. Indeed, to the extent that it does not refer to a Walrasian context, there appears to be no unifying 
framework and the relation between cost minimizing and strategic behaviour remains to be assessed. 
8. Maximization is used in a broad sense. Cowling and Sugden explicitely refer to Simon's notion of 
satisficing behaviour. 
9. Marglin (1974) argues that the development of a detailed division of labour within the putting out 
system and the subsequent introduction of the factory system, while actually depriving workers of their 
control over output and the production process, could not be explained in terms of their technical 
superiority. 
6   An attempt to extend Paretian analysis to the evolving nature of non-Walrasian 
capitalism has been made by suggesting a distinction between "ex ante" and "ex post" 
efficiency. It is suggested that, although some agents may suffer the consequences of 
power, this is not the end of the story: in the end they may turn out to be better off than 
they were before10. The implicit assumption is that "ex post" efficiency prevails over 
"ex ante" efficiency. As Bartlett (1989) argues, in his examination of the tale of the ant 
and the grasshopper, this intertemporal comparison is somewhat arbitrary11. 
 
  When cost minimizing behaviour coexists with actions aiming at dominance of 
a market it is arbitrary to contrast them as if they were mutually independent. In order 
to provide a clarifying example, consider a firm that has to choose between a scale in-
tensive production process with strong unions and a set of small plants which - ceteris 
paribus - are technically less profitable. The latter situation, however, divides workers, 
thereby curbing their bargaining power and allowing firms to pay lower wages than in 
the former case. Cost minimization should imply not only choosing the best technology 
for a given wage, but taking into account the wage that will prevail with each 
technology used. On the other hand, mere control over the bargaining power of the 
workers cannot be pushed to the point that, in the pursuit of higher profit margins, 
overall profits are forsaken. 
  The upshot of the above considerations is that, when the Walrasian-Paretian 
framework is abandoned, the corresponding notion of efficiency - as both the 
determinant and outcome of individual - behaviour must be abandoned as well. If some 
notion of power is assumed, it cannot be assumed to coexist with (allocative) efficiency 
as an independent determinant of behaviour. Power - strategic behaviour or cohertion 
of some kind - may be, in some instances, the best way to maximize profits. In other 
instances, it may indeed reduce profits - at least in a given period - while reducing the 
risk attached to the firm's activity. What is lacking is the unifying rule that explains 
how the two objectives interact. A Walrasian rule is inexistent. Implicit reference to it 
is misleading. 
 
  One of the basic features of a Walrasian environment is that agents cannot but 
behave in one way and that the outcome is one of equilibrium12. Once the assumptions 
underlying Walrasian equilibrium are abandoned, there is no reason to believe that this 
should still be true. 
  One would expect an alternative view to be searched for. This would require the 
identification of the relation between the behavioural rule of single (multinational) 
firms and the coordination instance traditionally represented by the market. However, 
such a relation is difficult to identify once situational determinism (Latsis, 1972) is 
forsaken. As a result, the present state of the theory of the MNC seems to be that, while 
                                                            
10. Pitelis (1991:32) states that "the transition from the market to the firm (putting-out first, factory after) 
[...] involved consensus and coercion, including state intervention. Ex ante it was often undesirable. Ex 
post, often (Pareto) efficient!". See also Dardi (1990). 
11. There is no reason to believe that what the grasshopper wants just before it dies of starvation is any 
more important than - or comparable to - what it wanted during the summer. In both instances the 
grasshopper had the same time preference. Because of it, its maximizing behaviour led it to prefer an 
outcome during the summer and a different one when winter came. But, just as two individuals cannot 
be compared in Paretian terms, the same applies to a single individual on different points in time. 
12. Hence the biunivocal relation between the two meanings assigned to the term "market". 
7 a great deal of effort goes to the identification of new explanations for the behaviour of 
firms, theoretical advances lag behind as far as processes and effects are concerned.  
  The risk is that the richness in hypotheses concerning the behaviour of MNCs 
may result in a broad taxonomy rather than in an exhaustive theory. 
 
 
4. THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL GOALS OF FIRMS 
 
4.1. Three goals 
 
  It is here suggested that a firm pursues the profit objective13 through different 
channels. When it focuses on the market, it can be viewed much like a team of people 
who pursue a common goal, as in Alchian and Demsetz (1972). However, when the 
distribution of value added within the firm is at issue, the team breaks up into at least 
two groups: the workers and what the above authors call the monitor, i.e. the person 
who organizes and coordinates production. 
  Recall that the profits may be determined in the following way: 
 
  Π = Π/VA * VA/Q * Q 
 
where Π are profits, VA is value added, Q is output. The firm will pursue its profits by 
acting upon these three variables14. Π/VA represents the distribution of income within 
the firm, VA/Q is the result of inter-firm integration along a production chain, Q 
represents sales15. 
  In Alchian and Demsetz's model, circumstances external to the firm guarantee 
that distribution (within the firm) be determined according to efficiency-based criteria. 
The inconsistency of this assumption should be clear by now. What is suggested here, 
on the contrary, is that distribution is a conflict issue that the monitor - or employer, or 
boss - must necessarily cope with. Thus, the employer must pursue two goals: an 
internal goal (acting upon Π/VA) and an external goal, pursued by acting upon the two 
remaining variables: VA/Q and Q16. 
  Q is affected by the nature of the goods sold (quality, price) and by entry/exit 
barriers in the market. In turn, the latter generally depend on technical features (e.g. 
economies of scale) or knowledge (e.g. technology)17. Although reference will be made 
to it, Q will not be central to my analysis. I shall focus on Π/VA and VA/Q. The 
underlying assumption is that organizational integration within and among firms is 
crucial to the determination of a pattern of industrial development. In turn, multinatio-
nalization acts upon national industries as they operate within the above pattern. Thus, 
                                                            
13. Profit need not be the prime objective of the firm. Here, it is taken into account to emphasize that it is not 
inconsistent but, rather, strictly related to the power relations that the firm establishes both with its workers and 
with other firms. 
14. The outcome will also depend on macroeconomic factors. A global view, however, lies behond the 
scope of the present paper. 
15. For simplicity's sake, inventories are assumed away. 
15. There is no a priori reason why the two goals should converge. Recall the above example of a firm that had 
to choose between a technically efficient scale intensive production and technically less convenient but wage 
curbing small plants.  
17. We are not concerned, here, with "external" barriers such as patents and protectionism. 
8 only when we understand the basic features of industrial development can we assess 
the effects of multinationalization. 
 
4.2. The External Goal 
 
  I shall first focus on the external goal. At any given moment it is reasonable and 
somewhat trivial to believe that a firm18 will try to use its inputs in the best of ways. 
The usual assumption would be that a series of elements is given, among these market 
structure. On the contrary, it is here assumed that a firm, when using its inputs, will not 
do so just within the constraints set by these external conditions; rather, it will do its 
best to change such constraints. 
  In an economy where information and knowledge are not perfectly transmitted, 
a firm aims at raising barriers to keep competitors out of a particular market19. In a 
similar fashion, knowledge barriers may be used to prevent suppliers or distributors 
from attaining excessive bargaining power20. 
  Organizational integration and ownership integration are ways to protect a 
firm's knowledge. Internalization is a commonly used concept, and is meant to include 
both. However, ownership integration may imply control independently of any 
organizational link: the take-over of a small innovative firm by a large producer is a 
possible case. On the other hand, ownership integration need not always occur, 
provided that organizational links are strong enough. In some instances, these may 
reflect an asymmetric market power: subcontracting by large firms to smaller "satellite" 
firms may provide an adequate example21. In other cases, control may be achieved even 
in the absence of asymmetric market power, through interaction in production and/or in 
carrying out innovation. Such an organizational integration may establish "intangible 
links" such that an interlocking control is established. 
  For the sake of simplicity we may depict two extreme cases of control22: market 
power cum arm's length transactions (MP)23 and organizational integration (OI). The 
choice of the integration strategy may depend on specific circumstances, as in the 
examples provided above. At a given point in time, technology, transaction costs, etc. 
should be relevant factors. In general, however, when these factors are not assumed to 
be given24, other elements must account for the choice.  
  It is here suggested that the choice between the above forms of integration - 
ownership and organizational - results from the degree of inter-firm rivalry: ownership 
                                                            
18. Note that "firm" may refer both to the employer and to the organization. A qualification will be made 
in case of possible confusion. 
19. In a neo-institutionalist framework, a rational firm would presumably compare (transaction) costs 
related to different distributions of knowledge, thereby choosing which is the most profitable. 
Internalization would result to the extent that it would reduce the firm's costs. Knowledge of costs, 
however, is a function of the distribution of knowledge, so that a complete comparison is hardly 
possible. In a situation of bonded rationality, a firm will merely try to achieve the best distribution of 
knowledge, given the constraints arising from the costs it knows or predicts. 
20. Cowling and Sugden (1987) cite Benetton's control of a network of suppliers. Much like in Marglin's 
analysis (1974, 1984), what gives Benetton its bargaining power is knowledge of the distribution 
network. 
21. See the above mentioned Benetton case. 
22. Intermediate forms are obviously possible, such as long term contracts. 
23. Ownership may be viewed, here as a special type of market power. 
24. We shall return to this further on. 
9 integration prevails when rivalry is high; the obverse applies with organizational 
integration. This does not mean that there is a strict correlation between the two. As 
historical studies on the decline of the economic dominating countries of the past 
suggest, institutional rigidities may often prevent changes in external integration to take 
place (Lazonick, 1991). Technological evolution plays a role, as we shall see further 
on. But a crucial determinant both of these institutional rigidities and of technological 
accumulation is what occurs within the firm, i.e. management strategies that pursue the 
internal goal.  It is to these strategies that we now turn. 
 
4.3. Knowledge within the Firm 
 
  Knowledge barriers may be introduced as a means to cope with the internal goal 
of the employer. In order to prevent workers from having excessive control over the 
production process, hence excessive bargaining power over distributional disputes, 
their knowledge of the process ought to be reduced to a minimum. 
  Knowledge of the production process by single workers depends on how the 
latter occurs, that is, on the technical and organizational division of labour within the 
firm. Following Marx, Radicals and Marxists have outlined these issues. The crucial 
ideas are that division of labour was pursued not (only) for technical but for social 
reasons (Marglin, 1974) and that, to this end, knowledge was transferred from workers 
onto the technology incorporated in the machines (Braverman, 1974). As a result, ever 
more deskilled workers were dominated (subsumed) by machines, thus by the profit 
motive of employers. 
  A problem arises with this approach, namely, to what extent is a thinking 
human being willing to comply with requirements that are not his/hers? Why should 
he/she not (voluntarily or, like Chaplin in Modern Times, involuntarily) wish, and 
attempt, to escape domination from such a mechanism? To put it in more traditional 
terms, shouldn't the propensity to shirk rise along with the alienating nature of the 
technology used? Indeed, technology does not appear to warrant any involvement of 
the labour force, although it does constrain the actions the latter can take. Thus, not one 
but two problems have to be dealt with by the employer. On the one hand workers have 
to be controlled; on the other, their consensus has to be maintained.  
  This leads us to organization of production within the firm. Indeed, control 
requires that the skills of workers be bounded by technology. Consensus requires that 
workers be involved in the pursuit of the firm's profit objective. For any given 
technology, this will depend on the organization and coordination of labour. 
  We are not too far from what neo-institutionalists claim. They acknowledge that 
shirking is  a problem, and suggest that a solution may be found by resorting to 
governance and/or contracts, i.e. some sort of management strategy. What is argued he-
re is that neither technology nor transaction costs are given (or, at least, exogenous). 
Shirking is the outcome of an alienating technology. In turn, technology ensues from 
the profit motive of the employer and evolves so as to prevent excessive control of the 
firm's activities by workers. Management strategies, concerning the organization of 
production within the firm, deal with the shirking problem.  
  A note of caution is necessary when dealing with technology and organization 
of production. Despite the need for an adequate distinction between these two concepts, 
it is rather difficult to trace one, either in functional or conceptual terms. Functionally, 
technology is related both to the internal and external goals. It must allow an unequal 
10 distribution of knowledge to occur: within the firm (to affect distribution); within the 
market for the firm's products (to affect the degree of monopoly), and; among vertically 
related firms (to affect the bargaining power of the firm with regard to its suppliers, 
clients, etc.). It may not meet all these requirements and, in fact, in most instances, it 
does not. Management strategies centred on the organization of production may thus 
supplement technology in pursuing the above goals. 
  Apart from the functions they perform, technology and the organization of 
production are also difficult to distinguish from a conceptual point of view. As we shall 
see further on, the division of labour determined by a management strategy may lead to 
the introduction of new machinery. In turn, this may change the bargaining power of 
the agents involved, thus feeding back on the organization of production. 
 
4.4. The Internal Goal 
 
  It is now possible to outline how organization of production may be carried out 
within the firm. Following A.L. Friedman (1984) we may consider two extreme cases: 
"Responsible Autonomy" and "Direct Control". In the former "managers try to 
accentuate the positive peculiar aspect of labour capacity: its malleability"25 (p. 179). 
In the second, "managers try to reduce the amount of responsibility of each individual 
worker by close supervision, and by setting out in advance and in great detail the 
specific tasks individual workers are to do" (p. 179)26.  
  Provided that there is a continuum between the two, it is the extreme cases here 
outlined that we shall focus on27. It is fairly easy to see that Direct Control (DC) 
reflects major concern for dominance whereas Responsible Autonomy (RA) is mostly 
concerned with consensus. DC is, therefore, based on a functional division of labour 
that splits up individual tasks, thus individuals' knowledge of the production process. 
RA, on the other hand, favours integration among tasks, thus furthers learning by doing 
by single workers as well as by teams, albeit within the constraints set by the given 
technology. 
  The division of labour determined by the organization of production affects the 
wage setting rules which, in turn, feed back on control within the firm. In fact, even if 
overall distribution between wages and profits were not to differ between a DC firm 
and an RA firm, wage setting rules do. With DC, workers may be easily classified 
according to their individual skills, which are strictly related to the specific task they 
perform. Wages depend on individual tasks. 
  With RA, workers are expected to gain an overall knowledge of the production 
process - or, at least, of a significant part of it28. Interaction among individuals prevents 
                                                            
25. Malleability consists in the fact that "you can get somebody to do something, once employed, beyond 
what may have been specified in the original employment contract" (Friedman, 1984:179).   
26. Friedman's interest is on how market conditions and expectations related to them affect the 
organization of the labour process. A similar approach may be found in Morroni (1991). Given that the 
purpose of this paper is different from Friedman's, my elaborations on his classification may differ from 
his original thinking. 
27. To simplify matters, in this section I assume away international relations. Indeed, delocalization of 
production could be a third possible strategy. I shall discuss this issue further on. 
28. This may appear inconsistent with what was said about technology as a means to deskill workers. 
Truly, to the extent that workers gain knowledge of different stages of the production process, the 
organization of production contrasts the function assigned to technology. This strategy will therefore be 
11 wages from being strictly related to specific tasks. Wages depend on faithfulness to the 
firm's goals, a proxy of which is seniority. 
  As a result of the division of labour within the firm, internal creation of 
knowledge (including technology) follows different paths. As the production process is 
split up into independent tasks, differences between departments within the firm beco-
me stronger and interaction drops. A DC firm's R&D laboratory need not have much 
relations with the shop floor; indeed, it may be located elsewhere. The opposite case is 
that of the RA firm, whose strategy will consist in favouring interaction among depar-
tments or even "using the factory as a laboratory"29. 
  Differences in knowledge creation are most likely to lead to differences in 
patterns of innovation. When the R&D department is left on its own, it will be easier 
for it to develop products which are independent of shop floor constraints. When the 
factory is used as a laboratory, on the other hand, on job learning will favour rapid 
process innovation within the above constraints. Thus, all other things given, it may be 
suggested that, within a firm, major breakthroughs and product innovations are 
favoured by DC while process innovation is enhanced by RA. 
 
4.5. Firms and Industries 
 
  Management strategies are relevant as determinants of the boundaries of a firm. 
Even if we assume that technical (static) economies of scale apply independently of the 
type of management strategy, other internal economies exist. This is rather strai-
ghtforward and much in line with neo-institutionalist literature. As Leijonhufvud 
(1985:218) suggests, "We might find a market gap between firms along the production 
chain at some stage where the market in the intermediate product issuing from the stage 
is thick enough so that firms on both sides of the gap are safe from hold-ups.". What is 
less straightforward is that "thickness"30 is not exogenous but depends on how 
standardized single stages of the production chain are. This, in turn, depends on the 
extent to which DC strategies are pushed31. 
  The vertical and horizontal division of labour within an industry - thus inter-
firm integration - is the result of the above strategies. Individual firms, however, are not 
independent of each other: their strategies must be compatible with the vertical division 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
possible only when firms are confident that workers do not use their knowledge against the firm's 
(employer's) interests. Technology, however, retains its function: the techniques and machinery 
underlying an automobile assembly plant remain substantially the same with DC and with RA. 
29. Y. Baba, quoted in Freeman (1994) 
30. Usually thickness refers to the number and value of transactions and to the number of (potential) 
transactors. The hold up problem may also arise in relation to the complexity of the transaction - which 
may involve several interdependent actions - and to the time range over which it occurs. As far as the 
present discussion is concerned, however, the crux of the matter does not change. 
31. Note that, as Leijonhufvud points out, the process is not linear. "As one subdivides the process of 
production vertically into a greater and greater number of simpler and simpler tasks, some of these tasks 
become so simple that a machine could do them. [...] Although the tasks that become mechanized tend to 
be quite simple, completely standardized tasks, the machines very often will be extremely specialized to 
doing just this one task (or series of tasks) in the production of just one product." (Leijonhufvud, 
1985:215; emphasis in the original).  
12 of labour of their integrated sector; they must be compatible also with the horizontal 
division of labour of their economy as a whole32. 
 
4.6. Path Dependence 
 
  We may summarize the discussion of this section by recalling that control is 
pursued within the firm and without. Control of the production process external to the 
firm - that is, of transactions between two firms operating on the same production chain 
- may occur in two extreme ways: through some sort of market power, which allows 
transactions to be carried out at arm's length (MP), or through organizational 
integration (OI). Control of the production process internal to the firm requires that its 
knowledge be withheld from workers (DC) or that, given their interdependence with 
the intangible assets of the firm, they be dependent only on that very firm (RA). 
  The pursuit both of the external and the internal goals may therefore entail 
either dominance-centred or cooperation-centred strategies. What may be worth 
stressing is that, whatever the strategy followed by single firms with regard to 
technology and the organization of production, path dependence precludes continuous 
changes. Apart from sunk costs related to machinery and equipment, a given 
organization of production determines a pattern in the interaction among individuals, as 
well as expectations, that cannot be drastically changed without causing serious 
disruption in future activity (Friedman, 1984).  
  As for cooperation-centred strategies, they require relatively greater continuity 
in terms both of the transactions carried out and of the transactors involved. Intangible 
links entail high sunk costs. Confidence is therefore essential, but it needs time to be 
established. Technology creation and innovative activity is based and, at the same time, 
requires such intangible links. 
  Given the above considerations, patterns of economic development are most 
likely to reflect regional regularities and specificities in the above strategies. Historical 
circumstances may lead to differences at the outset. Path dependence maintains them 
over time. 
 
  A final remark regards the relation between internal and external strategies. 
These strategies may be combined in various ways, leading to different patterns of 
industrial organization. We shall not examine these combinations in detail but focus on 
a specific issue, namely the relation between these strategies and competitiveness. 
When discussing technology, reference was implicitly made to the production process, 
rather than to specific goods33. Even though the distinction between process and 
product technology is not wholly satisfactory, we may assert that a given product may 
be obtained through different processes. To the extent that different processes may 
coexist within a productive technology, it can be argued that each firm may find a 
specific synthesis - or a compromise - between the goals it pursues on the goods market 
and its strategic requirements. 
                                                            
32. The conceptual relation between vertical (within a manufacturing process) and horizontal (among 
processes) division of labour is discussed in Leijonhufvud (1985). 
33. Technology relates both to production techniques and machinery and to types of products: steel 
manufacturing implies given production techniques, although these may coexist with different internal 
organization strategies. It is nonetheless a wholly distinct technology with respect to cast iron. See Aoki 
(1990) for a description of different organization strategies within the steel manufacturing technology. 
13   A relation was identified, however, between the organization of production 
within the firm (DC or RA) and the innovations most likely to occur (product or 
process respectively). This suggests that competitiveness in industries where product 
innovations are searched for, and where the R&D department has a prime role, will 
presumably be fostered by DC and MP34, while competitiveness in industries where 
product differentiation is most important may require RA and OI. 
  In the section that follows I shall focus on two extreme cases: the "American" 
(DC-MP) and the "Japanese" (RA-OI). Although I do not intend to discuss the other 
two, I do wish to point out that they may also be found. RA-MP is implicitly discussed 
by Friedman (1984) and explained in relation to the expectations that managers have 
over market demand. As for DC-OI, it is often the outcome of a strong process of 
technological competition, whereby firms establish joint ventures or other cooperative 
aggreements in specific areas of their business activities. 
 
 
5. PATTERNS OF MULTINATIONALIZATION 
 
 
  We may now return to multinationalization. Leaving aside intermediate 
situations, I wish to focus on the two extreme cases, which are named "Japanese" and 
"American" but obviously do not represent the richness of these nations' historical 
experiences. 
  Japanese multinationalism, as depicted in section 2, is consistent with the 
prevailing strategies adopted by Japanese firms in the pursuit of their internal and 
external goals. The model of the Japanese firm (Aoki, 1990) is basically founded on 
Responsible Autonomy (internal goal) and on strong Organizational Interdependence 
among firms operating along the production chain (external goal). The above 
discussion pointed out that such strategies favour process innovation and, in general, 
innovations within a given technology. When the technology associated to the do-
minating industry is "mature" in the above sense, there is little capability to switch to a 
new technology within the same industry. Furthermore, since firms are so interlinked, 
should only one part of the (production) chain be removed, the whole system would be 
disrupted35. Thus, it is the industry as a whole that has to be relocated. 
  The obverse applies to the (extreme) American model, based on Direct Control 
strategies (internal goal) and on monopoly power cum arm's length transactions with 
other firms (external goal). Here, it is product innovation and overall changes in te-
chnology that are favoured. So an industry is not abandoned but, rather, changed. 
Multinationalization consists in the duplication of productive plants abroad, 
independently of a specific industry. At the very least, it may consist in relocating 
plants that produce obsolete goods or apply obsolete processes, but the industries will 
be the same as in the home country. 
                                                            
34. With DC the R&D department is left unconstrained. Similarly it may be suggested that, with MP, 
venture capital leaves small innovative firms unconstrained. A DC-OI combination may nonetheless be 
effective: this is a frequent case with firms of the same size cooperating in hi-tec sectors. 
35. Obviously this need not be the case if multinationalization regards the marketing of the goods 
produced or customer related services. 
14   Historical characteristics of the two countries may have favoured these two 
models. Cultural traditions such as individualism in the US and the feudal heritage in 
Japan favoured the adoption of different management strategies. These, in turn, pro-
vided a pattern of innovation that was consistent with the technological potential of the 
two countries36. But the crucial point is that the models had a momentum of their own 
in that they retained and reproduced the basic features of these historical 
characteristics37. 
 
  Ozawa points out that the ultimate cause of Japanese multinationalization is 
Japan's pattern of industrial development. Obviously, one might look at 
multinationalization from a single firm's point of view, whereby each MNC would have 
a determinant (or set of determinants) of its own. A great deal of information and 
theoretical understanding would be lost, however. The approach suggested here is that 
if we try to establish a link between prevailing management strategies - as they are 
reflected in the pattern of industrial development - and multinationalization, not only 
will a more thorough view of the above processes be possible but it may be easier to 
appreciate the very effects of multinationalization. 
  Consider the two cases, here depicted as Japanese and American. Assume an 
industry lacks the innovative potential to overcome the problems it raises so that 
market prices and/or shadow prices rise relative to the single firm's prices. In the 
former case the single firm may find it convenient to switch to new activities, at least at 
home. In the latter case, public measures might be taken to merely raise private costs38. 
Either way, in the absence of other government interventions, the choice whether to go 
multinational or not will depend on single firms.  
  In the Japanese model, this mechanism may disrupt intra-industry relations. The 
whole system of innovation would be affected. This, in turn, would feed back on the 
firm's competitiveness. To make this point clear consider the following example, which 
allows us to focus on recent changes in Japanese multinationalization. 
  The industries that tend to become leaders in Japan's most recent phase of 
industrial development are on what is generally named as the technological frontier. 
Relevant innovations in these industries are less adaptive and process oriented than 
radical and product oriented. This implies far-seeing and financially demanding R&D 
investments. Innovations may have to be sought in international centres of excellence, 
far from where production is located (Cantwell, 1989). The rationale of technology 
acquisition is different from the past, when an original technology was obtained abroad 
and competitiveness was pursued through adaptations. Today competitiveness lies in 
the very novelty of the technology. 
  Thus the Japanese model of management strategies fits awkwardly with the 
competitive requirements its industrial development has led it to. A change is called 
for. One possible outcome is that cooperation with other firms at the international level 
is pursued to the point that it substitutes those in the home country. Should this occur, 
Japanese MNCs would possibly gain in rapidity of novelty acquisition, but the overall 
                                                            
36. At the end of World War II the US had a technological leadership while Japan had little technological 
capacity. 
37. "Despite the existence of militant unionism in Japan at various points in the first half of the twentieth 
century, there was never any attempt by Japanese workers or organizations to establish craft control on 
the shop floor." (Lazonick 1991:43; emphasis in the original). 
38. Other measures are possible, obviously, but we wish to focus on the outcome of individual strategies. 
15 competitiveness of the Japanese economy could be jeopardized, with negative feed-
backs on the very MNC. 
  The American model appears not to be subject to these problems, because inter-
firm cooperation is not crucial to its pattern of industrialization. Other problems, 
symmetrical to those that apply to Japan exist, however. Consider the consequences of 
an exogenous phenomenon such as monetary policy. When high interest rates prevail, 
firms focus on short-term returns. The division of labour associated to DC implies that 
everyone focus on his/her specific goal. Historical experience shows that, as a result, 
"the most successful middle managers became those who cut costs on the basis of 
existing technologies, as distinct from those who could contribute to process and 
product innovation." (Lazonick, 1991:49-50). 
  Under these circumstances, multinationalization as a cost cutting strategy might 
be effective in the short-run and it would do little harm to inter-firm relations in the 
USA. However, by shifting priority from innovation to cost cutting, it would certainly 
weaken the firm's and the country's technological capacity in the long-run. 
Multinationalization would enhance a loss of a general view of the firm's objectives. 
The same would not apply in Japan, where cost cutting goes along with process 
innovation and is therefore not inconsistent with the firm's long-run goals. 
  Such different effects of multinationalization are identifiable only because the 
latter is viewed in relation to the pattern of industrial development of the country (or 
countries) concerned, i.e. in relation to the prevailing patterns of integration in 
production. As in Cowling and Sugden these are not restricted to ownership, but 
include less formal links as well. 
  Note, however, that resorting to a broader concept of integration is not enough: 
effects cannot be properly assessed if prevailing patterns are disregarded. Consider, for 
instance, a "divide and rule" strategy. Here, the consistency between a firm's strategy 
and what occurs in the home industry is not taken into account. The assumed effect 
tends to be univocal, e.g. the curbing of union power and consequent increase in the 
(multinational) firm's overall control. Conversely, the above examples show that 
multinationalization may be detrimental both to industrial systems and to the 
profitability of the firms involved39. The patterns of inter-firm relations and/or those of 
innovation may be disrupted within the country or area of origin. The global trade-off 
between the objective pursued and the effect on the overall productive structure may 
turn out to be different from what the single firm expected, especially when the latter's 
time preference was reduced by exogenous circumstances. 
 
  Since effects depend on the underlying process of industrial development, a 
theory of the determinants which were to neglect such a process would preclude a full 
understanding of the phenomena under exam. Such an approach might even be 
misleading, should multinationalization result directly from industry- or nation-specific 
circumstances. Truly, firm-specific determinants would always be identifiable, but the 
actual nature of the process would not be grasped. 
 
 
6. FINAL REMARKS 
                                                            
39. Obviously a "ceteris paribus" condition is assumed. This need not imply that negative effects will 
actually occur, but that, as a first approximation, things may not turn out as expected. 
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  At the outset of this paper I drew on Japanese experience to point out that there 
is a gap between theories of the MNC on the one hand and explanations of 
multinationalization processes on the other. I claimed that prevailing theories identify 
determinants of multinationalization within an implicit Walrasian framework, thereby 
assuming the applicability of the notion of allocative efficiency and the biunivocal 
relation between firms and markets that is typical of situational determinism. Even 
when Walrasian assumptions are abandoned, a univocal relation is assumed between a 
firm's behaviour and the ensuing environment, where determinants seem to be 
independent of the surrounding coordination instance.  
  Drawing on Ozawa's approach, I suggested that a different framework should 
be envisaged. Multinationalization would then be an outcome of the pattern of 
industrial development of a country. By industrial development I meant not only what 
industries are prominent in an economy but, above all, the prevailing forms of 
integration in production. 
  A major role in the determination of these patterns was assigned to the way 
firms pursue their internal and external goals. Technology and the organization of the 
production process were viewed, in this regard, as crucial features in strategies that 
attempt to determine distribution, innovation, and the very boundaries of the firm. 
Firms, however, were not viewed as mutually independent but, rather, as dependent 
both on existing patterns of integration and on institutional and technological 
conditions. 
  The ensuing framework, albeit tentative, tries to relate an economy's features to 
the behaviour of the firm but it does not attempt any reductionist microfoundation. It 
allows to understand differences in national patterns of industrialization and multi-
nationalization and it also suggests that the effects of multinationalization need not be 
those expected by a single firm. Indeed, they may turn out to be detrimental both to the 
home country and to the home firm. 
  The American and Japanese cases have been considered as two extremes. The 
relation between pattern of domestic industrialization and pattern of 
multinationalization may be extended to other situations, however. Reference to 
national environments need not imply that the latter are homogeneous in terms of 
patterns of integration. Italy is an interesting case, in this regard, since it is 
characterized by a peculiar mixture of the two above depicted systems. Some industries 
developed according to Direct Control and Market Power cum arm's length strategies 
and are presently confronted with the need to keep their technological standards in line 
with international technological competition. Other industries developed according to 
Responsible Autonomy and Organizational Interaction strategies, thereby gaining a 
competitive edge by resorting to process innovation. Two distinct patterns of in-
dustrialization may be depicted, in this regard (Becattini, Rullani, 1995). Patterns of 
multinationalization also vary a great deal. In some instances they may consist in a 
geographical decentralization of production to cut unit costs (Acocella, Ramazzotti, 
1995) while in others they may be a means to achieve "transnational technological 
cross fertilization" (R. Grandinetti, E. Rullani, 1994).  
  The above discussion suggested that the two extreme models could be affected 
in opposite ways by exogenous events such as technological competition or monetary 
policy. The rough and ready conclusions drawn for these extreme cases require a great 
17 deal of adaptation if more complex environments are to be explained. No single exit 
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